by the Night Writer
I was eating my Pop Tarts and reading a story in the Strib this morning when a thought popped into my head about the similarity between a violent, capital crime and violence against capital.
In the story a 17-year-old accused murderer has had charges against him dismissed because the witnesses are afraid to testify against him; one even left the state. Both the accused killer, Ramadan Abdi Shiekh Osman, and the victim, Ahmed Nur Ali, are members of the Somali community; Ali was an Augsburg student volunteering at the community center where the murder took place.
Now witness intimidation and the old self-preservation instinct are nothing new and certainly not unique to a particular ethnic group; it is the foundation of mob rule in any era or community. There’s nothing especially unique about this particular story, either: justice is denied, the rule of law is flouted and a likely killer walks the streets. All of this because witnesses have learned a painful lesson and don’t believe that law enforcement can protect them from reprisals and have therefore made themselves scarce or recanted their testimony. What may ultimately happen to the community as a result?
Now a neighborhood thug and the bankruptcies of Chrysler and GM — where the senior investors lost their legal standing for recovery by executive fiat — may look as if they are worlds apart, but I started to think about the “lessons” learned by the neighborhood witnesses, and if investors weren’t learning the same lessons. That is, you have to depend on your own instincts and resources if you can’t depend on the rule of law to look after you and preserve your community (or capital) when the prevailing gang gets to decide right and wrong and reward its friends and abuse its enemies. In the local community you clam up, lie low and even move away to avoid reprisals or becoming a target. In the investor community the equivalent is nearly the same: funds dry up, investors lie low and capital — being a lot more portable than an oppressed family — moves to a better neighborhood with less risk of confiscation.
And the community gets ugly, fast.
Throughout history, poverty is the normal condition of man. Advances which permit this norm to be exceeded — here and there, now and then — are the work of an extremely small minority, frequently despised, often condemned, and almost always opposed by all right-thinking people. Whenever this tiny minority is kept from creating, or (as sometimes happens) is driven out of a society, the people then slip back into abject poverty. This is known as “bad luck.”
— Robert A. Heinlein
Good point. Personally, I’m still not convinced that what President Obama/Blago/Capone did is legal. Exactly what provision is made in the Constitution for this, and exactly how does it square with Article 1’s requirement for uniform bankruptcy provisions?
I’m with you, but I wasn’t trying to write about the legality or constitutionality of what happened, merely the effective impact.
Another question: should these ever be challenged in court – which will no doubt require an eventual SCOTUS ruling – what will the redress be 10 years from now, assuming their is a functioning legal system and currency still in place?
obama has the power of the investigative branch of govt.
anybody threatening his vision will soon learn the wisdom of letting it go.
Admittedly I have not read up on this topic very well, but I have caught a few articles. My impression is not so much that the O has forced anything, per se, but rather that he has decided to entice creditors into his socialist scheme with additional bailout money. Faced with the relative unknown of bankruptcy litigation (disputed valuation of assets, risky adversarial proceedings, judicial whim), it seems like a slim majority of unsecured creditors have decided to take the bird in the hand. Without the carrot of additional federal bailout dollars, these players would be faced with the lion/hyena/vulture scenario typical of most bankruptcy megacases and they evidently believe that under those circumstances they could have received less or paid more legal fees for the same outcome. Hence the O, like so many of his predecessors, has used the federal government’s financial means to upset the natural outcomes of the laws of economics in this case.
That is a matter for some discussion. Clearly, if GM restructures without taxpayer funds, the immediate process will be more painful for a lot of people. The cuts would have to be deeper; maybe not $30 Bln deeper in direct correlation to the government’s stake, but deep enough to cause more investor loss, ruin more suppliers, and put more people in unemployment. On the flipside, without government aid, we could all keep more of our tax dollars right where they belong—in our own wallets. Hence, the question to me is, when, if ever, should any level of government (federal or otherwise) step in to [hopefully] ease the pain? Is Uncle Sam enabling bad behavior and creating codependency among large, mismanaged companies? Or is this plan just helping innocent suppliers and small businesses without any byproduct of major-corporation codependency because those large companies have enough disincentive away from this type of behavior even with the government bailout? If government help is ever acceptable, there must be a line—not every business failure could possibly be deemed worthy of intervention. And the type of help must be considered. I would have far preferred to see government loans than a government equity stake in GM.
Lots more to say, but my 15 seconds were up a long time ago.
Yep. And there will always be a Switzerland, or a Cayman Islands or somesuch. Really good post, NW.
Thanks, Mr. D. While there will always be places where wealth can hide out from taxes, taxes are also a cost of doing business that can be planned for and capitalists can take into account when investing. My biggest concern here is that the capital will “sit out” rather than be invested, or will go elsewhere, if investors can’t have some assurances and security for the risks they take.
As Legal Eye pointed out, bankruptcy settlements aren’t a picnic and are a worse-case scenario where few if any come out “whole”. If you’ve put money into a company, however, (whether you’re Scrooge McDuck or the head of a public pension fund) you’d like to be sure at least of your place in line when whatever assets are divvied up and liquidated. If established laws and precedent go out the window, so does capital, leaving only your captive investors (taxpayers) to keep the lights on when they should be using that money to buy products, not debt.
Thanks, “Legal Eye,” but as I read the Constitution, the President has no power to appropriate funds–that would start of course with Congress.
Legal remedy….boy, that one’s tough. Maybe just put the perpetrator in taxpayer funded housing for a long time, and this time not nearly so plush as his current digs?
And finally a comment actually to the post; yes, it is scary, and dangerous, for the rule of law to become somehow “optional,” whether we like the results, whether they show proper empathy, or not.
(that’s a good #3 to your list; President Obama’s selection of a judge with “empathy” for the Supreme Court)
Bike Bubba: Once again, I admit to my lack of information, but I believe Congress already did appropriate funds by giving the Executive Branch a basic carte blanche to use massive bailout funds almost without oversight. This points to a fundamental problem in Congress which is also a problem with the Sotomayor nomination to which you allude in your second post: Congress routinely seeks to pass the buck and cede power to the other branches, whether it be bailout funds or Constitutional policy-making.
That said, I couldn’t agree with you and Night Writer more that changing the rules in the middle of the game is very dangerous.